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Jamaica’s Debt-Propelled Economy:  
A Failed Economic Strategy and Its Aftermath 
 
Donald J. Harris 
 
 
1.  Summary 
 
Jamaica now faces the critical issue of how to pull the economy out of the ditch it finds 
itself in and the painful adjustments that process will undoubtedly require.  It is necessary 
to examine how exactly the country got itself into this situation.  The purpose of this 
exercise is not to assign blame.  Rather, it is an essential prerequisite for understanding 
how to get out of the ditch and to move forward.  Accordingly, in this paper, I seek (a) to 
draw out some of the crucial lessons to be learned from the experience of economic 
policies actually pursued in the period since 1990, and (b) to derive from this analysis 
some constructive proposals for action now.   
 
Starting in the early „90s, concerted efforts were made to design a new economic growth 
strategy, the National Industrial Policy.
1
  This Policy (NIP) was officially adopted by the 
government in 1996.  The basic point of the analysis presented here is that the core 
economic strategy actually pursued by the government, when examined in its totality, 
was very different from the announced strategy.  The strategy actually pursued I call the 
strategy of a debt-propelled economy.  The NIP was, instead, explicitly based on a 
strategy of export-led growth.  I argue that the strategy pursued ultimately proved to be 
unsustainable, self-defeating, and undermined the very goals of the NIP.  My proposals 
for action follow directly from this basic finding. 
 
 
2.  Two Different Types of Economic Strategy 
 
It will help to see the thrust of my argument if one keeps in mind a sharp distinction I 
have made elsewhere
2
 between two types of economic strategy:   
 
                                                 
1
   For the purpose of full disclosure, I should indicate that I worked as an economic consultant for the 
Government of Jamaica (GOJ) on and off during the period 1994 to1998, in the process of developing the 
NIP.  That was an exciting time, with much talk, vigorous debate, as well as some action in moving the ball 
forward policy-wise.  The NIP emerged from the heat and light of that time.  I would like to acknowledge 
here the extraordinary team-work, done by a large number of dedicated, smart, and talented people, which 
went into laying the groundwork for this project, and bringing it to fruition as a comprehensive strategic 
plan for national development based on genuine participation by a wide cross-section of the public.  (See 
the Acknowledgements at the end of this report.)  Some are representatives of the highest caliber and finest 
traditions of the Jamaican civil service, and some are prominent voices from the private sector who have 
long been laboring in the fields on behalf of themselves and the national interest. 
 
2
    In the specific context of the Jamaican economy, export-led growth is discussed in detail in Harris 
(1997).  The concept of the Jamaican economy as a “debt-propelled economy” was introduced in a speech 
that I gave to a symposium held at UWI in 1986 (published in the booklet (Davies, 1986) and is developed 
further in a forthcoming paper (Harris, 2009). 
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 (1)  the strategy of export-led growth; 
(2)  the strategy of a debt-propelled economy. 
 
The essential distinction between them is in the source of the dynamic that drives the 
economy.  To put it simply, in one case the momentum of the economy is driven by 
exports.  In the other it is driven by debt.  I argue that these two strategies are not only 
fundamentally different and incompatible, but also mutually opposed (certainly in the 
experience of Jamaica, though one could argue for strategic convergence in other 
historical cases, e.g. South Korea). 
 
The debt-propelled economy is a path followed for a very long time in Jamaica, by a 
succession of different governments.
3
  Having failed to wean public policy off it, the 
country now has to face squarely its consequences and the task of cleaning up the results 
it has produced.  And what an immense task that is turning out to be!  
 
It was evident all along that there were deep structural problems in the Jamaican 
economy that were not being addressed by public policy, except perhaps by a succession 
of short term palliatives.  My studies of the actual empirical record of long-term trends up 
to 1989 showed that there was a “dramatic change in economic performance” or “striking 
structural discontinuity” that occurred around 1974-75 (Harris, 1990, 1994).  This break 
was represented most significantly by a decline in the long-term growth rate of exports 
from a previous average of 9.3 % per annum to a much lower rate of 2.4%, while GDP 
went into a steep decline at a rate of -0.24%.  
 
It was already clear also that export growth, at that slower pace, could be carried along 
for a while by the continued growth of bauxite and tourism (each running into its own 
predictable headwinds), aided by the newly emerging apparel industry (sheltered under 
the protective but fragile umbrella of the Caribbean Basin Initiative),  while the 
traditional vessels of bananas and sugar (mainstays of support during earlier 
expansionary eras while operating under heavy protection from the “mother country”) 
had already sprung major leaks.  The only real hope for creating new momentum was to 
bolster some of the ongoing export activities that could foresee good prospects and to 
diversify strategically into new product lines. 
                                                 
3
   In the turbulent times of 1986, similar in many ways to today, there was a lot of talk about “the debt 
problem” in Jamaica, directed at the government then in power.  The conference presentations published in 
Davies (1986) were a part of that dialogue.  Looking forward presciently to the perpetuation of this “debt 
problem” for a long time to come, I was warning then: “I should emphasize that this is not only a short term 
crisis problem.  I think that there is a fundamental error in the existing discussion which seeks to make it 
appear that this is merely a short term adjustment problem.  My argument here is that it is a permanent 
built-in feature of the economy because that overlay of debt obligation will continue to ramify for another 
25 to 30 years.” (Davies, 1986, p. 78).  We are now only 23 years out from that time, and still in the same 
fix.  Future historians may find a certain historical irony in the fact that the person who edited the 
presentations of that conference for publication came later to occupy the seat of Finance Minister and 
helped to perpetuate the very same “debt problem” that was theretofore being questioned.  My point here is 
not intended to single out any particular individual.  Rather, it is to drive home the important point that the 
debt-propelled economy has been around for a very long time in Jamaica and systematically pursued by a 
succession of different governments. 
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The NIP aimed to break out of the mould of the past and to tackle these problems in a 
forthright, comprehensive, coherent and concerted manner.  This innovative effort took 
place in a striking historical context in the early „90s when the world economy was 
changing rapidly and offered both challenges and opportunities that required moving to a 
more proactive and agile mode of response. 
 
3.  The National Industrial Policy 
 
The innovative approach and rich details of the NIP, as regards its strategic focus, core 
policies, sectoral strategies, and proposed implementation strategy, can be more usefully 
studied by reading the original policy-document (GOJ, 1996).  It will suffice here to 
review briefly its overall content and scope. 
 
First, let me quote from the Foreword: 
 
Let 1996 be the year in which we move forward boldly by building up the 
momentum of growth and development to take the country into the 21
st
 
century. (p. ii) … At a minimum, we must set ourselves the goal of 
achieving a per capita income of $4,000 by the year 2010. This requires an 
average annual growth in GDP of six percent. (p. iii) … At the same time, 
the government is committed to developing an integrated and structured 
approach to economic policy. … Accordingly, policies for stabilization of 
the macroeconomy must be integrated with policies for promoting growth 
and diversification of production. … The process of policy making and 
implementation requires building consensus among all actors. To this end, 
the Government is committed to building and sustaining a Social 
Partnership, bringing together the leadership of the country in all areas (p. 
iv). 
 
and from the Executive Summary, on the important matter of “Policy Implementation” 
(leaving out here key details regarding the proposed “time-phased sequence of 
implementation strategies”): 
 
Implementation of the Policy will proceed according to a three-phased 
overlapping sequence of strategies … The strategy in each phase has its 
own set of well-defined priorities and economic measures, designed to 
achieve definite results within the relevant time-frame and to lay the 
groundwork for the next phase. (p. 8) …   
Central direction, coordination, integration, and monitoring of the overall 
Policy will be provided by an inter-ministerial council, headed by the 
Prime Minister.  This is to be called the Development Council.  The 
Development Council will seek to focus attention on meeting the 
fundamental objectives of the Policy and on assessing performance within 
the relevant time-frame. (p. 11) …  
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 The entire network of public sector agencies will be called upon to 
implement particular strategies, programmes, projects, and action plans, in 
line with the requirements of the overall Policy.  Those agencies must 
therefore be structured and operated in a manner consistent with timely, 
efficient, and effective implementation of policy. (pp. 11-12) … 
A consultative system will be put in place to allow systematic and regular 
interaction between the Government, business, labour, and NGOs.  The 
aim is to promote an active partnership, on a continuing basis, so as to 
share ideas on policy and strategy formulation, to explore issues, and to 
resolve problems. (p. 12) 
 
What is crystal clear from careful reading of this document is that the NIP was 
aggressively, assertively, and explicitly based on a strategy of export-led growth.  Its 
rallying cry was “building international competitiveness”, aiming towards the goal of 
export growth and diversification.  It accepted the essential role of government in 
creating the enabling environment for investment, while relying on owners and managers 
of Jamaica-based firms to strengthen their internal conditions, by increased productivity 
and efficiency in the use of machinery and labor, upgrading technology, training of 
workers, improving product quality and diversity, finding new markets, and other 
entrepreneurial initiatives. 
 
The basic frame of the policy is shown in the following graphs taken from the text of the 
document. 
  
Graph #1 shows the comprehensive scope of the overall Strategic Plan summarized in a 
Policy Matrix. 
 
Graph #2 shows that the NIP was conceived as the basic foundation on which would be 
erected a policy regime that would focus on investment as the central pillar for building 
a production system for “growth and diversification of tradable goods and services” – in 
short, for an “export push”.  Within the ambit of the NIP, specific policies for investment 
promotion, infrastructure development, and for providing a “support framework” would 
be geared to that objective.  All other policy mechanisms and tools would be 
subordinated to that objective. 
 
Graphs #3 & #4 show that the policy was concretely focused on targeted production- 
sectors, forming an identified group of five “strategic industry clusters”.  These clusters 
were seen as having the potential for sustained growth, through reliance on the strengths 
of leading sectors (“growth poles”) within each cluster and on the synergies that could be 
created by exploiting linkages with other sectors and sub-sectors inside the cluster and 
between clusters.  Broad-based technical support was seen as coming from the already 
strong and growing sectors of Information Technology and Telecommunication. 
 
Graph #5 shows the proposed time-sequence of implementation strategies.  
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 4.  The Factual Record of Economic Performance 
 
So, what went wrong and why?  And what needs to be done now in order to get it right?  
Providing a compelling answer to these questions is an essential prerequisite for 
understanding how to move forward. 
 
For this purpose, it is important to begin by placing some key facts on the table, 
describing what actually happened.  The data presented in the following Graphs are all 
based on official data sources. 
 
1. The basic and general economic trend during the period under review is summarized 
by three conspicuous features, shown in Graph #6: 
 
        *  Total public debt mushrooms exponentially after 1994/5, reaching a peak as a 
percentage of GDP (124%) in 2003 and a peak level of US$14 billion in the last two 
years, three times the size of the early „90s. 
        *  Meanwhile, Gross Domestic Product remains nearly flat, growing at a negligible 
rate of 0.9% on average for the whole period.   
        *  The (nominal) exchange rate falls through the floor; the Jamaican dollar, which 
was worth US$0.14 in 1990, falls to slightly more than 1¢. 
 
This is a dismal performance by any standard, whether viewed in terms of (a) the payoff 
to the country as a whole in terms of growth of real output from accumulation of a vast 
amount of debt, or (b) in comparison with other countries that were able to take 
advantage of the opportunities available in a time of rapid growth in the world economy 
to grow themselves at a high rate.  In fact, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to 
say that an economic catastrophe was wreaked on the country, because, just like the 
recent hurricane Dean (2007), or before that, Ivan (2004) and Gilbert (1988), the country 
is now left with the obligation of an enormous mountain of debt to pay back and the 
responsibility to clean up the damage that was thereby created. 
 
Note two interesting and, in my view, highly important features of this performance: 
 
(a)  the timing of the takeoff  into exponential growth of the debt coincides pretty closely 
with the decision to leave the IMF in 1995; 
 
(b)  the timing of the takeoff also coincides pretty closely with the introduction of the NIP 
in 1996. 
 
Taking these two coincidences together might lead one to intuitively grasp that this was 
not a mere coincidence but, instead, that there is a causal connection between them, i.e. 
that one thing led to another and then to another.  Specifically, that leaving the IMF led to 
a regime of fiscal indiscipline; and fiscal indiscipline led to undermining the NIP.  That 
intuition, in my judgement, would not be entirely wrong, but it would require some 
further analysis to give it legs.  I want to try to cast some light on this issue here.   
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 2.  Graph #7 shows that financial institutions were doing pretty well for themselves in 
terms of profitability, judging from the size of the average spread between lending and 
deposit rates, with a heavy bias in portfolios in favor of government debt.  At the same 
time, depositors were evidently getting hit with negative real returns on deposits.  
Another interesting feature worth noting is the long lag, of about five years, in adjustment 
of loan rate to a declining inflation rate, as shown in Graph #8.   Looking closely at the 
actual performance of the financial sector in terms of both the length of this lag and the 
size of spreads in comparison with other financial markets in the region and elsewhere 
(coupled with casual observation of the actual structure of the financial market in 
Jamaica) leads to the reasonable inference that there was (is) no such thing as a 
competitive market for finance in Jamaica.  My sense is that the market has been 
dominated by a few banks and finance houses which have been able to exercise a great 
deal of market power. 
 
Now, looking at the overall picture drawn so far, one finds that there are two basic things 
operating here.  On the one side, there is a government that is addicted to deficit spending 
(see Graph #13); this is evidently what lies behind the mushrooming public debt.  On the 
other side, there is a financial industry, with an apparently monopolistic market structure, 
that is feeding off the trough of government debt.  These two things seemingly go hand in 
hand, and appear to be mutually supportive of each other.  Some would conclude, 
perhaps not too rashly, that this is a very unhealthy situation for a country.   I myself find 
it to be at once the most intriguing and yet the most revealing feature in the picture of 
what has been going on in the Jamaican economy during the period under review.  
 
3.  This feature of the picture is reinforced when we look at the next graphs.  Graphs #9 
and #10 depict what is happening on the production side of the economy (the time 
periods are separated because of the difference in the deflator used for the two periods).   
What we see here is an extraordinary and phenomenal transformation in the structure of 
the Jamaican economy.  At the outset, in 1992-1993, manufacturing is more than one and 
a half (actually 1.7) times the size of finance and insurance.  By 2007 the situation is 
completely reversed: finance and insurance become 1.4 times the size of manufacture 
(and that does not take account of the sizeable growth in inter-sectoral payments from all 
other sectors to the financial sector, what the national accounts call “financial 
intermediation services”).  It can be readily seen from the graphs that the crossover point 
is dated at around 2001.   A similar process of relative decline occurs in agriculture, 
which goes through a sharp decline starting in 1997 to a new low in 2007.  
 
Looking at the actual sector shares in 2007: Finance & Insurance (11.2%) is almost as big 
as Government (11.7%) and slightly less than Transport & Communication (12.3%).  The 
biggest sector is distribution (Wholesale, Retail, etc. = 18.9%), and the financial sector is 
approaching it very closely if one adds in financial intermediation services. 
 
It appears, then, that the financial sector has grown to become a real behemoth of an 
industry and, instead of complementing and reinforcing growth in the rest of the 
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 economy, its growth has been opposite to and, I argue later, detrimental to much of the 
rest of the economy.
4
 
 
4.   The dismal picture of economic performance also shows up on the foreign-trade side.  
During the previous decade, 1986-95, exports of goods and services grew at a pretty good 
pace of 9%, an uptick from the previous pattern.  In the following decade, 1996-2005, the 
growth rate fell back to 1.3%.  There has been a slight increase since then to about 3% 
but that is still far below the achievement of the previous decade.  Graph #11 shows 
clearly the overall pattern of trade as one of relatively stagnant exports and rapidly 
growing imports, such as to create an ever growing trade-gap to be paid for by inflows of 
credit and other finances.  Remittances also served as a cushion throughout the period to 
support this gap.  
 
5.  Finally, to fill out the picture, consider what is happening within the financing 
operations of government.  As shown in Graph #12, most strikingly, interest expense 
grows as a share of total revenue, reaching a peak of 60% in 2003/04, twice its initial 
level in 1990, before falling back to about 40% in 2007/08.  At the same time, the share 
of capital expenditure falls from an initial high of 18% to a low of 3%, recovering later to 
a level still below its earlier high point.  Expenditure on programs also undergoes a 
diminishing share.  Clearly, interest expense managed to crowd-out all other major items 
of expenditure, except for wages and salaries, and remains as the dominant component of 
government expenditure.  
 
In summary, this is the factual record of economic performance.  To be fair, it must be 
said that significant economic gains were made in some areas during the NIP period, 
particularly in investments in hotel facilities and in highway construction.  However, a 
final accounting of these projects requires a thorough cost-benefit analysis not yet made, 
taking account of the actual cost-overruns involved, the quality of work done, the 
environmental effects, and the opportunities forgone.   Moreover, in the final analysis, the 
actual strategy must be judged by its total outcomes over the entire duration, not by 
picking and choosing the high or low points.  
 
 
5.  Explaining the “Economic Muddle”. 
 
I consider now the question: how to explain this pattern of economic performance?  By 
analysis of the economic strategy actually pursued by the government, I show here that 
the observed outcomes are due, at least in part, to deeply rooted flaws in that strategy.   
 
                                                 
4
   The profound shifts identified here in the productive structure of the economy must correspondingly 
have had far-reaching consequences for the pattern of personal income distribution (specifically the 
components of wages, interest, and other property income).  There must also have been a correspondingly 
significant influence on the structure of economic incentives (specifically, incentives for the direction of 
entrepreneurial effort, employment of labor, and individual investment in education and training).  These 
consequences are not examined here, but certainly deserve much closer study. 
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 First, let me clear out of the way some misleading approaches to this question.  Official 
accounts and public discussion emphasize the role of “shocks” as causal factors, some 
“external” (oil price increases), some “natural” (hurricanes), and some supposedly 
random and unexpected (Air Jamaica debt, FINSAC debt, public sector wage 
adjustments).  All such events are presumed misleadingly to be outside the control of 
decision-makers in government.  This approach obscures more basic underlying forces in 
the economy and leads to confusion in policy analysis, particularly as regards the role of 
debt.   
 
Total national debt incurred in this period is indeed a big and cumulative “shock”.  More 
important, it is also a continuous, persistent, and sustained condition, and the result of 
basic decisions by the authorities.  Debt is debt, whatever its source.  As the public debt 
grows, decisions are made to incur it, about how to manage it, and there are consequences 
of such decisions.  It is a measure of good (or bad) statecraft how that process is 
managed.  With bad statecraft, debt can propel the economy into a ditch.   
 
There was also talk, during this period, about a mysterious “economic model” that the 
authorities were supposed to be following as the basic guide to their decision making.  I 
have looked hard but never found an explicit account of what that model was.  I did 
distribute and later published a formal mathematical model to explain some of what was 
happening back then, showing specifically that there were “fundamental imbalances” in 
the economy and that “the policy regime is necessarily boxed into a tight corner” (Harris, 
1999), but this was a far cry from what the authorities were saying.  My analysis is 
developed further in a forthcoming paper (Harris, 2009). 
 
Nonetheless, it is possible to unearth, by deeper probing, the underlying economic 
strategy actually pursued and its implications.  This is what I try to do here.  The analysis 
is based on a straightforward application of demand and supply analysis, looking out 
from the pivotal window of the foreign exchange market (see Graph #14).  To achieve 
clarity of exposition, since there are many different factors at play at the same time, the 
main points are enumerated and ordered as follows. 
 
1.  The explicitly declared policy priority of the government was what it called 
“macroeconomic stability”.  This stance, when it is examined closely, comes down to one 
and only one thing, i.e. a single-minded focus on defending the nominal exchange 
rate.  (Recall that this policy came into play after a period when the government had 
been operating a strictly managed foreign-exchange “auction” and deployed officers of 
the Bank of Jamaica to scurry around the countryside with suitcases to ferret out 
whatever foreign currency they could find, or relying on generous benefactors to come to 
the rescue of the auction with timely donated cash and loans.  Leaving behind this 
unwieldy, fragile, and ineffective system, the foreign exchange market was “liberalized”, 
supposedly to allow the market to find its own level.  But it was not the case of a freely 
floating, flexible exchange rate regime.  Rather, the government was now operating a 
kind of “dirty float” in which the authorities would seek to intervene as deemed necessary 
to keep the market “stable”.) 
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 2.  This single-minded approach itself is already to be seen as the indication of a 
fundamental flaw in the strategy being pursued.  This is because, to engage in a little 
bit of policy speak, there has to be as many policy instruments as there are objectives in a 
policy.  So, if your objectives also include export growth, then you have to deploy other 
policy tools to meet that objective, besides the exchange rate itself and the tool used to 
defend the exchange rate.  Moreover, you end up with a basic contradiction (or “policy 
inconsistency”) if the instrument you are using to defend the exchange rate is also 
destroying the objective of export growth.  What I go on to show in the rest of this 
section is exactly how this contradiction plays out in the strategy pursued by the 
government so as to make that strategy self-defeating, unsustainable, and destructive of 
the goals of the NIP.   The argument is somewhat tedious and, in parts, a bit technical.  
So, the reader who is impatient with following the details can safely move on to the next 
section. 
 
3.  The setting is one in which, throughout the period under review, there is heavy 
pressure on the exchange rate due to excess demand in the foreign exchange market.  
The important thing to note here is that the biggest source of excess demand comes from 
the government itself.  The government is the biggest player in the market on the demand 
side, because of heavy borrowing to meet its financial requirements: the current budget 
deficit, plus debt service obligations for past debt, plus building up the international 
reserves, plus a portion of imports associated with the expenditure side of the 
government‟s budget.  What this situation amounts to is that (one branch of) the 
government is busy trying to defend the exchange rate against demand pressure in the 
foreign exchange market, while (another branch of) the government itself is busy creating 
the demand pressure by its heavy requirements for foreign exchange.  
  
One could say that it is a case of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing.  I 
prefer to think of it, and I said so at the time, as the case of a dog furiously chasing its 
own tail. The aptness of this image is reinforced by considering further points to be made 
below. 
 
4.  The key instrument, the government’s weapon of choice, for defending the 
exchange rate is the interest rate.  This is based on the seemingly reasonable 
calculation of the so-called “arbitrage condition”, i.e. that liquid funds will go where they 
can get the highest return, therefore you want to keep the interest rate just high enough, 
say, epsilon above the next best option, so as to induce a sufficient flow of funds into the 
market to relieve the pressure of demand and meet the volume requirements of 
government paper on offer to the public.  From some of its published reports, this appears 
to be what the government was saying in defense of its interest rate policy, i.e. that it is a 
necessity dictated by financial arbitrage.  In my view, this argument is simply not 
supported by closer scrutiny.  Why? 
 
a) From the data presented here, note that the interest rate differential was quite large, 
much greater than a mere epsilon above the next best option, say, the T-bills offered by 
the USA and Trinidad & Tobago, and greater than any reasonable estimate of the relevant 
financial risk premium.  
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b)  Interest rates on GOJ paper remained high even after USA T-bill rates started falling, 
the latter dropping eventually to near zero when the Jamaica T-bill was still paying 
upwards of 20%. 
 
c)  The argument strictly assumes that the domestic financial market is highly 
competitive, with arm‟s length trading among all participants, which it is not, as I 
suggested before. 
 
One could argue, instead, that the government failed to leverage its own powerful 
position in the market (at least in the domestic market).  Effectively acting as a 
monopolist in the domestic market, the government was selling one of the best financial 
products, bonds that (for a time at least, before they were subsequently downgraded) 
were highly rated because of a constitutionally ratified government guarantee against 
default.  The authorities should have been able to exercise countervailing power, certainly 
in the domestic market, against the monopolistic power of local banks and financiers.  My 
sense is that they did not.  In effect, they were allowing the banks to run rings around 
them and hold to ransom the national treasury. 
 
5.  The supplementary weapon used to defend the exchange rate is the international 
reserves.  Buildup of massive reserves, though itself a source of excess demand in the 
foreign exchange market, is supposed to be a threat held by the government over the 
heads of agents in the market to enforce market discipline.  But, if it is going to be 
perceived as a credible threat, then it has to be used forcefully and in a timely manner.   
My sense is that the authorities were not very adept in using this weapon, for the 
following reasons: 
(a) simple correlation of net changes in the reserves with movements in the exchange rate 
shows a significant lag in response and no significant or direct correlation with 
subsequent  movements in the exchange rate; 
(b) forceful use of this weapon should also have helped to tamp down domestic interest 
rates, but the data show no significant effect there either. 
 
It also has to be recognized that there is an opportunity cost involved in holding the 
nation‟s wealth in reserves.  The reserves are, strictly speaking, capital assets that are 
sitting idly in portfolios held abroad, presumably in US treasurys, and earning a pittance 
compared with the general capital market or with the “sovereign wealth funds” of other 
countries.  The country is thereby losing out on possibilities for gain that could advance 
the social interest. 
 
6.  The interest rate is a two-edged sword.  It can be a powerful weapon, used skillfully 
as a tool to manage the foreign exchange market.  But it has another side:  it drives up 
the cost of servicing government debt.  Consequently, interest expense on a growing 
debt eats up a bigger and bigger share in the budget, forcing the government to borrow 
more in order to obtain the funds to pay interest on existing debt.  Eventually, new debt is 
then being used to pay off old debt.  This is a classic case of a debt trap. There is every 
indication that the government‟s fiscal position has in fact deteriorated to that ultimate 
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 state, if not earlier, certainly today.  Whatever the case, it is clear from the data that, 
throughout this process, debt service has served to crowd out other government programs 
and public investment.  From the standpoint of pursuing consistently an export-led 
strategy, this crowding-out effect matters crucially, to the extent that it cramps the 
ability of government to finance the broad range of activities that provide support for the 
export push, as promised in the “support framework” outlined in the NIP. 
 
7.  There is no free lunch.   By abandoning the IMF option and moving to finance more 
and more debt from local sources, the government was substituting high-cost credit 
for low-cost credit.  As the justification for this move, it was said at the time that the 
government was seeking autonomy and independence from IMF supervision out of 
concern for “national sovereignty”.  But whatever one may think of the value of such 
independence, it is evident that it does not come free.  It has a significant cost, measured 
by the difference between the interest cost of borrowing from private credit institutions 
and the cost of IMF and other bilateral and multilateral funds.  Moreover, in stark 
historical irony, the government has now placed itself in the ironical position of having to 
return to the IMF after proving, during a run of about 14 years, how well (?) it can 
manage its own finances in the absence of IMF supervision. 
  
8.  The authorities failed to grasp the full meaning and practical significance of the 
important distinction between the nominal exchange rate NER and the real 
exchange rate RER.  Or, if they did grasp that distinction, they failed to operationalize it 
in their conduct of policy.  This is a tricky technical point that would require some 
technical exposition to fully develop.  But it can be simply explained as follows.  The 
NER is the money value of the country‟s currency in relation to that of its trading 
partners, say, the US dollar.  The RER is the money value adjusted for the difference in 
relative prices and costs between countries.  Ultimately, it is the RER that governs the 
possibility of achieving “stability” in the foreign exchange market.  It follows from this 
condition that good statecraft requires a delicate balancing of the goals of “money” 
management of NER in the foreign exchange market with “cost” management on the 
production side of the economy.  In other words, the essence of good statecraft in this 
arena, hence of a well functioning political directorate, is being able to find that “sweet 
spot” where both sides, the monetary side and the cost side are in balance.  In my view, 
the authorities never managed to achieve that balance by deploying the full range of 
instruments available to them.  To this extent, one must conclude that there was a 
fundamental imbalance in the strategy being pursued. 
 
Here again, one could say that it is a case of the right hand not knowing what the left 
hand is doing.  Instead, I say that it is more a case of the dog chasing its own tail. The 
reason for this lies in the observed outcome, i.e. that there exists a large and growing gap 
between imports and exports while the NER goes into continuous decline.  The fact is 
that, when the country loses its cost competitiveness with its relevant trading partners, it 
is most likely to be flooded by cheaper imports while its exporters suffer loss of market 
share in export markets.  This sets up a perverse negative feedback effect on the foreign 
exchange market by increasing demand for foreign exchange while reducing supply.  
Then, something must give.  In a dirty float as well as a clean float, it is typically the 
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 exchange rate that gives.  The authorities must then keep chasing the elusive goal of a 
“stable” exchange rate for as long as they fail to take control of the conditions that 
determine cost competitiveness.  To achieve such control would have required a more 
evenly balanced strategy with broad-based implementation of the strategy outlined in the 
NIP.  It is important to note here that all of the relevant cost factors were explicitly 
identified in studies done for the NIP project (and in the export study (Harris, 1997)) and 
fully laid out in the policy document (GOJ, 1996, p. 54) as matters requiring systematic 
action by both government and private sector.  
 
9.  If interest is a cost for government it is also a cost for business.  In effect the 
exchange rate policy adopted means that, while the interest rate is being used to defend 
the nominal exchange rate, and thereby provide significant gains for the financial sector, 
it is also being used, in effect, to punish domestic producers (especially those who are 
most exposed because of heavy reliance on credit to sustain production).    
 
Exporters are likely to feel this hit the most, perhaps more so than importers, because 
of the long lag between starting up production and receipt of revenues from a distant 
market.  In this respect, there is a certain asymmetry between exporters and importers.  
Importers get lower cost trade-credit based on finished goods they already have on hand, 
or on the wharf, perhaps on consignment.  Exporters, on the other hand, have to start up 
production for a product they don‟t yet have and for a foreign market which they may not 
have, with time and effort spent in the interim to manage the production process from 
start to finish, to find the market, and deliver the goods to market.  The difference is 
higher risk, hence higher interest rate.  At least, that is what the bankers say.  I think it is 
more a matter of how you collateralize debt.  In fact, the bankers have proved themselves 
to lack the initiative and enterprise to find out how best to do this to make profits.  My 
sense is that there is much room for financial innovation here, and there is undoubtedly a 
market to be had for a smart financial investor willing to try.  
 
10.  My final point is, in a sense, the most important for evaluating the overall strategy.  It 
concerns the damaging effect of the strategy on investment and production, hence on 
imports and exports, and the consequent negative feedback effect on the foreign 
exchange market.  The factors accounting for this circular and perverse effect of the 
strategy are already apparent from the previous points.  The more general point to be 
made here is that this effect means that the strategy as a whole turns out to be 
unsustainable and necessarily self-defeating in terms of its own goal.  In the language 
of sports, the authorities were scoring an “own goal”, or worse, “shooting themselves in 
the foot”, and no celebration is due for that achievement.  Furthermore, in this process, 
the strategy also had the damaging “same-side” effect of undermining the supposedly 
shared goals of the NIP. 
 
11. Considered as a whole, the brunt of my argument then is this.  There was a 
fundamental flaw in the strategy pursued, consisting of a fatal imbalance in the 
policy-mix.  Because of this flaw, the government managed to box itself into a classic 
debt trap from which it became impossible to escape because, in this process, the 
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 government had pushed aside and undercut the only solid basis for a sustainable solution, 
which was through a genuine export-led strategy as promised in the NIP. 
 
 
6.  A Theory of Implementation Failure 
 
I would like to go on now to make a further point.  For illustration, I present in Graph #15 
a Matrix of the Policy Development Process.  The cells are deliberately left blank.  They 
can be filled in with information from the NIP itself along with detailed documents, 
studies, and analyses, prepared during the process of laying the groundwork for the NIP, 
that should still be available in the files of PIOJ, JAMPRO, MOF, BOJ, OPM (Technical 
Secretariat & Development Council), as well as very useful and relevant work done by 
private-sector agencies (JEA, JMA, PSOJ, JCC, etc.).  The cells are marked with a check-
mark simply to indicate that the relevant work was done in each case, effectively and 
intelligently so.   
 
Now, the idea here is that policy development is a process.   Let‟s say you start off with 
the preliminary work of doing the sector-by-sector analyses, you identify the clusters you 
want to target, then do the “SWOT” analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
threats), set out the objectives you think you want to achieve, and identify the polices and 
instruments you want to use to achieve those objectives.  All this was done in the 
development process of the NIP.  And then you get to the all important implementation 
stage after which, if successfully accomplished, you hope to have some evidence of 
(good) performance on which to base your evaluation.   In the best of circumstances, this 
is a dynamic and iterative process.  You get to performance evaluation and you conclude 
you need to make adjustments/corrections in the policy, and so you go back to the start 
and rework the process. 
 
But, in practice, a blockage tends to occur in the implementation stage, identified as the 
red zone in this graph.  This is evidently what happened with the NIP.  So, my argument 
is that, associated with the failure of economic strategy there was also what I would call 
a critical implementation failure. 
 
I have a “theory” of implementation failure as a chronic feature of policy development 
and governance in Jamaica.  This problem is not confined to Jamaica; some would say it 
is a universal problem but, for the moment, I won‟t go there.  It is certainly found 
elsewhere in the Caribbean.  For instance, Havelock Brewster has done a detailed study 
(unpublished, as far as I know) of all the policy decisions taken at the meetings of Heads 
of Government of CARICOM and found that only a minute proportion of those decisions 
have been actively engaged by the governments and agencies supposed to implement 
them. 
 
Reasons usually given for this failure are many. 
 
Relevant, but in the overall scheme of things not to be highly rated, are the usual 
complaints about “government bureaucracy”.  There is definitely something to this, in my 
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 view, especially at the upper-most rungs of the ladder, not as much at the intermediate 
levels, at which I have found some of the most devoted, team oriented, and talented 
people (see the Acknowledgements at the end of this report).  Those who have no 
experience of working at those upper levels of government can have little or no 
appreciation of the terribly dysfunctional “games that some people play” (in terms of turf 
wars, petty infighting, disrespect for subordinates, and dismissal of serious analytical-
policy work as “too academic”).  But those bumps in the road should not be allowed to 
stand in the way of the larger vision. 
 
The role of money in politics is an obvious issue and a universal problem.  This issue 
acquires greater significance in a setting, such as I have outlined here, where there exists 
an apparent symbiosis between government and an overgrown financial industry.  In 
reaction, some in Jamaica have called for public financing of elections.  I would be 
reluctant to urge this as a solution now, given the parlous state of the Government Budget 
and the heavy burden already being inflicted on the taxpayer that is likely to increase 
further in moves to find a way out of the current economic crisis. 
 
As regards the larger scheme of things, and in particular how things work generally in 
Jamaica‟s political economy, I can think of no better analytical treatment of this than in 
the prolific work of Professor Carl Stone; see especially his magnum opus (Stone, 1980) 
which is still highly relevant today.  However, stepping away from Stone‟s broader 
message for the moment (and because I think the problem is much deeper and larger than 
can be discussed here), I wish to focus here on a different tack capable of yielding 
working principles for designing solutions  that can receive more immediate attention and 
action.  
 
At this more pragmatic level, I think the problem is, first, one of institutions: i.e. 
 
(a) existing regulatory institutions that do not perform well their assigned job of 
providing oversight, accountability and transparency, and need to be shaken up to do so;  
 
(b) missing institutions that could serve to enhance and strengthen those functions as well 
as focus and direct action in accordance with priorities and plans generally agreed upon. 
 
Second, it is a problem of failure to articulate and distinguish the proper space for 
performing the functions of legislating policy as against the functions of executing 
policy.  In Jamaica, the two functions have tended to be fused in practice, despite what 
the Constitution says about the proper and distinct roles of Parliament and the Civil 
Service.  This situation often results in a terrible mismatch, in some cases, of Ministers 
and required executive skills, and in others, of competent Permanent Secretaries and 
meddlesome Ministers, and still others, of Ministers with recalcitrant (and vengeful?) 
Permanent Secretaries. Generally speaking, I think that the Westminster model of 
government, as it has evolved in Jamaica (and perhaps in some other Caribbean 
countries), has not worked out very well in practice and has now become quite 
dysfunctional. 
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 7.  Looking to the Future from the Past: Constructive Proposals for Action Now 
 
Recognizing where the country stands now, overwhelmed by an economic crisis and 
burdened with the legacies of the past, there is much that has to be done in the short term 
to deal with the most urgent problems.  In many cases, these involve technical issues, for 
instance about management of the existing public debt, fiscal consolidation, tax policy, 
that are now under discussion by officials and the public, and need not be addressed here. 
 
But, looking forward now, and thinking long-term, the critical question is: how to 
overcome the chronic tendency to strategy failure and implementation failure, as a 
characteristic feature of economic policy and governance in Jamaica. This problem is 
deeply rooted in our post-independence history and political culture.  Nevertheless, it is 
still possible to come up with working principles for designing practical solutions 
relevant to the situation the country faces today.  There is no better time than the present 
to do this.  The crisis itself demands it, and every crisis is an opportunity to tackle 
problems that in other times may prove intractable.  Moreover, addressing some of these 
problems is relatively costless, and could prove a handy way of getting some savings in 
the budget as I show below. 
 
Regarding the broad issue of institutions for effective implementation of public policy, 
let me make it clear, at the outset, that I am not necessarily advocating constitutional 
change here and now.  There was much debate about this matter during the „90s, some of 
it quite constructive in my view, including contributions by the current Prime Minister 
(then leader of the NDM).  But because of the pressures of the moment, this does not 
seem to be an appropriate time to press this matter.  Besides, before we get to that, there 
are other intermediate steps worth taking that could be readily adopted. 
 
Accordingly, I offer the following proposals for action now. 
 
1.  My first and leading proposal, as the first order of business for the day, is to separate 
development policy and planning from the Ministry of Finance.  The proper role of 
the MoF, enshrined in the constitution, is to manage the budgetary financing activities of 
the government (the so-called “money bills”).  The constitution does not say that the 
Minister holding this office should also be directly responsible for economic 
development policy and planning.  The comingling of the latter with the former is a 
recipe for failure and disaster, if not subjected to proper controls.  To avoid this outcome 
and achieve better balance in the economic policy-mix, the legitimate interests of the 
MoF (divested of its current functions of “economic planning”) and of the BoJ (duly 
constituted as an independent Central Bank) must be counterbalanced by a separate 
institutional leadership of the development effort.  To this end, I propose the formation of 
a separate and distinct Ministry of Development and Planning.  This new ministry 
could then be made to absorb many of the functions of development and planning, 
currently scattered over many different ministries and agencies, within a single apparatus 
of government.  That would sit well with the current and urgent objective of reducing the 
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 cost of government and meeting the desired goal of a reduced number of cabinet 
positions suggested long ago by the Nettleford Committee.
5
  
 
It is necessary to stress the meaning and significance of this proposal.  In the complex 
and challenging conditions of today‟s world, issues of economic development and 
planning require a holistic and integrated approach to forming public policy and 
priorities, based on thorough analysis and understanding of the complex structure of the 
economy, its component parts, the interrelations among them, and the factors which 
alternately hinder and promote change.  To address these issues with a sharp and 
concentrated focus requires a competent and forceful driver within the Cabinet (a warrior 
for the cause!), vested with properly constituted authority (and surrounded by a team of 
competent personnel), who can direct, motivate, and coordinate appropriate action.  To 
subsume these matters entirely within the confines of the budget process, a process which 
merits full attention on its own terms and must itself be subordinated to policies and 
priorities determined elsewhere, is bound to result in confusion and dismal failure such as 
we have witnessed in the period under review here. 
 
2.  The other equally significant and important feature of this proposal is that, by 
restoring the Ministry of Finance to its proper and unique constitutional role of managing 
the money bills, it seeks to place the MoF on a stronger footing to implement the 
imperative of fiscal discipline, without which the country is destined to continue to 
undergo future bouts of debt explosion.  The MoF must then be made to operate under 
strict requirements that the budget must “add up”, and the adding up verified by an 
independent office, i.e. the office of the Auditor General.  The MoF would be expected to 
perform well only when the fiscal accounts balance.  It should not matter whether this is 
done in a one-year or three-year cycle. The audited fiscal accounts must also be placed on 
full display for all to see, both in Parliament and before the general public.  This 
requirement forces maturity on the part of Government and the general public, because it 
demands transparency and accountability in government financing operations and allows 
the public to engage in informed debate about those operations.   
 
Because many of the statutory bodies were set up in the past to bypass parliamentary 
oversight and public scrutiny, serious information asymmetry problems have come into 
play, leaving Parliament and the public in the dark.  Moreover, this allowed for the 
creation of off-budget and contingent liabilities along with the maintenance by 
government of active deferred financing accounts with the large banks.  Consequently, 
fiscal accounts were always at odds with actual fiscal expenditures, government could not 
program accurately its demand for funds, hence could not predict accurately impact of its 
demand for funds on interest rates, hence constantly missing interest rate targets, with the 
budget deficit then becoming the residual in this causal chain.   
 
To break into this causal chain at its source, the operations of all statutory agencies must 
be placed “on the books”, and the MoF must be made to give up the practice of off-
budget operations. The system of government guaranteed loans and advances to statutory 
                                                 
5
   One could reasonably expect that such a Ministry, conceived in this way, would make a perfectly natural 
fit integrated with the Office of the Prime Minister. 
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 agencies without a corresponding obligation for those agencies to transfer their surpluses 
to the Consolidated Fund must be revised.  Furthermore, instituting and enforcing a 
proper treasury management function and rigorous control of the contract procurement 
process are necessary requirements to bring the overall budget into balance. 
 
3.  If the BoJ is to be legitimately considered an autonomous and independent Central 
Bank, then it must be made to justify and validate that status by standing guard against 
the fiscal imprudence of the MoF, instead of aiding and abetting it by allowing the MoF 
easy and uncontrolled access to the many monetary instruments (T-bills, repos, etc.) that 
enable and facilitate such imprudence.  Furthermore, the BoJ must itself exhibit fiscal 
prudence, technical competence and professionalism in the internal management of its 
own affairs, inasmuch as it must also seek to strengthen regulatory control over private 
financial institutions under its purview.   
 
4.  A major source of concern must be to rein in and bring under proper coordination, 
scrutiny, and accountability, the role of key government agencies, such as 
Development Bank of Jamaica, Urban Development Corporation, Jamaica Promotions 
Corporation (JAMPRO), and National Housing Trust.  Proper coordination of this 
particular set of agencies should become central to executing the economic development 
effort under the guidance of policy priorities and directives coming from the new 
Ministry of Development and Planning. 
 
5.  All operations of government must be subjected to oversight and accountability 
through open and transparent procedures.  This requires beefing up and giving teeth 
to the agencies responsible for performing this role (e.g. Auditor General, Contractor 
General, and Director of Public Prosecutions) as well as firming up the role of relevant 
Parliamentary Committees. 
 
6. Reform and proper regulation of the financial sector to enforce rules of 
competition and good behavior are essential to moving forward.  If the symbiotic 
relationship between government debt and the finance industry has become dysfunctional 
for the economy as a whole, then reform of one side of this relationship necessitates 
reform of the other.  This is made even more necessary now that the sector has grown to 
be bloated and fat from feeding at the trough of public debt.  It will be difficult to wean 
those elements of the private sector that have fed off this largesse to move into more 
productive investments where the economic risks and management requirements are very 
different and more challenging.  I certainly hold no brief for the investors who 
succumbed to the easy inducements of the debt bubble.  But I also think it is 
disingenuous for some current and former public officials to be now criticizing investors 
for not taking risks, when those officials were themselves responsible for creating and 
promoting the conditions for investors to gain exceptionally high returns from virtually 
riskless government paper. 
 
7.  More constructively, it is necessary to promote the emergence of new dynamic 
leadership within and without the financial sector, a new cadre of financial 
innovators, who will themselves seek out profitable opportunities to channel funds into 
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 long-term productive investments, acting under appropriate regulatory oversight to avoid 
reckless schemes such as those that came to light in the FINSAC era.   In specific terms, 
this new leadership would seek to develop new mechanisms and instruments for serving 
the following purposes: 
(a)  deepen financial intermediation towards the long end of the spectrum (equity and 
venture capital), as distinct from short-term debt financing; 
(b)  improve access to finance for MSMEs oriented to export or import substitution, by 
finding effective and legitimate ways to collateralize debt;  
(c)  strengthen the collective, self-regulating credit/saving institutions, that have existed 
for a long time in credit unions and the “partner” system, but more along the operational 
lines of the famous Grameen bank in Bangladesh. 
 
8.  As concerns productive investment, until and unless systematic efforts are made to 
reduce the elements of risk, uncertainty and cost associated with the environment for 
conducting business operations in the factory and on the farm (urban crime, praedial 
larceny, bureaucratic delays, energy costs, etc.), as well as to restructure the complex and 
unwieldy system of tax incentives, it seems unlikely that there will be a significant 
resurgence of domestic private investment in export-producing activities.  Moreover, the 
current state of the government‟s budget puts on hold many public investment projects 
and programs for providing a “support framework” for private investment.  Some 
productive capacity has already been wiped out by policy failures of the past, especially 
in manufacturing, but there is viable agricultural land that can be brought into production 
for domestic food and for inputs into processing as well as for export.  Supply of skilled 
labour, schooled in the requirements for work in modern industry and agriculture, will be 
a significant constraint that challenges the capacity of the educational and training 
institutions to respond. 
 
9.  It is useful to adopt a model of private cum public-sector strategic partnership to 
pursue economic targets of opportunity for investment and export, where the targets are 
identified and pursued through an open and transparent, structured and deliberative 
process.  The idea here is to take advantage of the executive abilities and entrepreneurial 
skills of some of the dynamic leaders in the private sector (who have proved in practice 
their strengths as business leaders as well as their commitment to the national interest) to 
form operational teams to get things done. 
 
I have in mind here the instructive example of the Costa Rican coalition, CINDE (loosely 
translated from the Spanish as “Costa Rican coalition for initiatives for national 
development”).  Their success in winning an agreement with Intel for a major IT 
investment (US$300m in a computer chip plant) in Costa Rica in 1996 is now duly 
celebrated in business-school case-studies (see Spar, 1998).  During work in Costa Rica 
in 1994, I was fortunate to be able to observe closely the action on the ground in the early 
stages of project planning and implementation leading up to the actual agreement.  It was 
truly an impressive performance by CINDE, working hand-in-hand with government 
personnel, acting with professionalism, skill, competent management, and wise, forceful 
leadership, to coordinate and drive the process to a successful agreement and subsequent 
delivery of objectives.  
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There is another instructive example closer to home, familiar to those of us old enough to 
remember the case of the bauxite levy negotiations admirably documented in the book: 
Jamaica in the World Aluminium Industry, by Dr. Carlton Davis. 
 
10.  Strengthening the technical and administrative capacity of human resources in 
the public sector is a major requirement for successful policy implementation.  Down-
sizing of government presents an opportunity for rationalizing (“right-sizing”) the 
allocation and effective use of the best talent currently employed in government.  Useful 
approaches to increasing the supply of such talent at all levels (adding to the entry-level 
supply coming out of local schools and colleges) include breaking down the barriers to 
labour mobility within CARICOM and tapping into the vast talent-pool of the diaspora.  
 
11.  At the top levels of government, it is necessary to find a way to rejuvenate the 
executive positions in executive institutions in the public sector.  There is no objective 
reason why the official Director or Governor of a government agency or statutory body 
should be allowed to hold on to that position for up to 15 or 20 years, and more in some 
cases, before yielding it up to younger, highly qualified, aspiring candidates, and moving 
on to another position, or to a comfortable retirement, or proving his/her supposed mettle 
and talent by competing in the international labor market.  This practice may serve 
perversely to discourage aspiring and talented candidates and cause them to vote with 
their feet by moving to more welcoming environments.  How else (apart from obvious 
salary and working conditions and the small size of the domestic market) can one account 
for all the highly talented, migratory young Jamaicans that one finds in top-level 
positions overseas? 
 
12.  In all this effort, there is a crucial role for wise, visionary, and pragmatic 
leadership at the top of government, in defining the vision, giving directions, insisting 
on the proper balance in the mix of policies being pursued, ensuring that there is a well-
functioning network of teams in place to carry out the vision, and disciplining the 
slackers and miscreants.  There is no formula for a solution to this problem.  We either 
have it or we don‟t.  We can usually tell when we have it and when we don‟t, but 
unfortunately only after the fact.  In a parliamentary democracy like ours, we have to take 
our chance and choose between the options we have.  That could turn out to be like a crap 
shoot.   
 
13.  The problem here is that we have for too long cultivated and held up for celebration 
the image of the charismatic leader.  That kind of leadership can only take us so far, 
and may turn out to be totally redundant in the modern era.  Looking around us today, at 
the countries that are doing well, we find that the kind of leadership that is working is far 
from the charismatic model.  They are good managers of Cabinets and of other 
functionaries inside the state apparatus as well as leaders of the public conscience.  They 
don‟t have to have PhDs; that qualification, however acquired, can sometimes be used to 
promote empty rhetoric, grandstanding, and braggadocio (“doctor politics”), and thereby 
serve as a handicap.  They are sufficiently confident and self assured to surround 
themselves with teams of highly skilled professionals who work together in a 
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 collaborative and collegial way; they draw on people and ideas from government, 
business, universities and trade unions; and they have a broad base of support in the 
community.  We have to begin to demand these qualities from our own leaders. 
 
14.  Finally, we also have to disabuse ourselves of the false notion that somehow all of 
our ills are due to foreign sources (“external shocks”), things that we do not ourselves 
control, and hence have no responsibility for their consequences. We are indeed a small 
country, facing much of the time “outside” forces that may seem to constrain and 
overwhelm our actions.  But that is no cause to pull back and leave ourselves at the mercy 
of those forces, or feign an inability to do anything about them.  Other countries, just as 
small, are managing to hold their own and to thrive in the same international 
environment.  We have to find our own niche and make the best of it.  This begins with 
recognizing our strengths and weaknesses, learning the lessons from our failures and 
successes in the past, and taking responsibility for our own present and future actions. 
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formation of a Social Partnership to bring together all these groups and representatives of 
government. 
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I should mention here the work of the JEA in particular, led by an impressive team of 
energetic and talented women:  Beverly Lopez, Beverly Morgan, and Pauline Gray (who 
tragically passed away at an early age).  They asked me to undertake a project for the 
JEA on export policy that resulted in the monograph (Harris, 1997).  I readily took on 
that task as a way of strengthening the most important voice in the private sector at that 
time speaking out for the objective and necessity of a strategy of export-led growth.   
 
Finally, I should also mention some other prominent voices that were speaking to the 
issues from the private sector, including Dr.  Marshall Hall ( Jamaica Producers Group), 
Douglas Orane (GraceKennedy), Dr. Ralph Thompson (Seprod), Claude Clarke 
(Highgate Chocolates), Charles Ross (PSOJ), Anthony Gomes (columnist), Beverly 
Manley and Anthony Abrahams (both of them as the smart and provocative leaders of the 
Breakfast Club). 
 
There are many others too numerous to mention.  To all goes my appreciation for their 
stalwart efforts. 
 
I report all of this activity here, not out of a narrow concern with history and 
personalities, but in order to drive home a number of important and general points: 
 
1.  There is not much new that one can say or write about problems of the Jamaican 
economy that has not been done already by people struggling on the ground here to deal 
with those problems. 
 
2.   There is truly an impressive number of committed and talented people, both in the 
public and private sector, who have devoted time, effort, and resources to grappling with 
the problems we face as a country.   
  
3.  It must give those of us who have already “been there and done that”, so to speak,  a 
sense of déjà vu to be returning to work our way again through some of the same sets of 
problems and issues today.   
 
4.  This is a measure of how much progress we have made, or lack of it, over the years. 
 
5.  Finally, and most important, I want to emphasize the element of team work in all the 
activities that I have just described.  What has struck me over the years is that we have a 
strong and enduring capacity for collective action to get things done in the national 
interest at the middle levels of our society.  Where we hit up against a wall, or run up 
against the most formidable obstacles, is at the top levels of our national leadership. 
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GRAPH #1 
From National Industrial Policy, p. 3 
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 * Labour Market Policy 
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 * Public Sector Reform 
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GRAPH #2 
From National Industrial Policy,  p.6 
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GRAPH #3 
From National Industrial Policy, p. 9 
 
Industrial Policy: Instruments and Targets 
 
 
 
 
  
SALISES Working Paper 1 Jamaica’s Debt-Propelled Economy
30
  
GRAPH #4 
From National Industrial Policy, p. 133 
 
 Targeting Strategic Clusters 
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Note: The numbers associated with the clusters do not represent a ranking of the clusters. 
SALISES Working Paper 1 Jamaica’s Debt-Propelled Economy
31
  
GRAPH #5 
From National Industrial Policy, p. 8 
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GRAPH #6 
Jamaica: economic performance, 1990-2008
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GRAPH #7 
Avg. Interest Rates & Inflation Rate, 1994-2008
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GRAPH #9 
Sector Shares of GDP, 1992-2001
(in constant 1986 prices)
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GRAPH #10 
Sector Shares of GDP, 1998-2007
 (in constant 2003 prices)
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                   FISIM = “Financial intermediation services indirectly measured” 
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GRAPH #11 
Exports and Imports of Goods & Services (US$m)
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GRAPH #12 
Interest Expense vs Capital Expenditure as 
Shares of Government Revenue
Correlation coefficient = - 0.78
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GRAPH #13 
Government Surplus/Deficit as Proportion 
of Government Revenue and of GDP
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GRAPH #14 
The Foreign Exchange Market 
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GRAPH #15 
Matrix of the Policy Development Process 
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